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P U iΙο I

Sex & Mysticism in Plato
John Thorp
University of Western Ontario
This paper is for presentation at the joint meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
and the American Philological Association, Atlanta, December 27-30, 1994
There is a stark and central tension in Plato's thought. It concerns the grand epistemic
adventure which he recommends in various language throughout his life, the adventure of
dialectic, of true philosophy, of coming to know the forms. For there seem to be three
structurally different pictures offered of what that adventure is.
On the one hand, in the arguments that all undergraduates can repeat by heart, it is a form
of remembering, anamnesis. It is a priori knowledge, garnered in the preincamation period,
which does not however lie ready to hand for incarnate people; rather it has to be prompted or
teased out of forgetfulness. In the Meno and the Phaedo, this knowledge is represented as a fairly
humdrum affair: everyone can talk about equal sticks, and nearly everyone can sort out some
elementary truths of geometry. In the Phaedrus, however, this triggering of the memory of the
forms is represented as a much more exciting, a much more rarely successful, and a much more
satisfying process: indeed the supreme adventure of human life.
On the second hand, though, another current of thought in Plato seems to represent
knowledge of the forms as a posteriori, as produced by abstraction from particular sensory
experiences. Nowhere is this thought clearer, perhaps, than in Diotima's speech in the
Symposium, where the would-be initiate into the mysteries of love is urged to notice that the
beauty that is upon one beautiful body is the same as that which is upon another, and ultimately
that it is the same beauty which infuses bodies, souls, institutions, and sciences. Or again the
Sophist represents the achievement of philosophy as the summative grasp of the map of the
forms, possible only after much quiet labour working out the relationship among individual
forms by the method of division (253 d-e). In the Symposium the process of coming to know the
forms is represented as the highest experience of which a human being is capable (21 Id); it is
described in the language of the mysteries, of the epiphany of the divine. In the Sophist on the
other hand this high language is absent, and the achievement of the philosopher gives a much
calmer pleasure and satisfaction. This last is the sensible Plato, the Oxford Plato, the Plato who
thinks that the aim of dialectic is 'to achieve, by means of argument, an understanding of the
terms, concepts, distinctions or what you will that we employ in thought'1.
On the third hand, however, there is yet another picture of the dialectician's knowledge of
the forms, and especially the supèrior forms; it is a posteriori knowledge of a very different kind
— mystical intuition. That is, we do not come to know the form of the good by abstracting it
from various good things; rather we experience it directly in an intellectual act. Language
suggesting this picture abounds in the Republic, and the Symposium, and is to be found also, I
think, in die Seventh Letter. It is a side of Plato which has not, in my view, been taken seriously
enough in the literature and at which we shall have cause to look more carefully below.
I do not think that there is any very easy way out of this tension, this contradiction. No
doubt it is wise on many grounds to distinguish Plato’s Earlier Dialectic from Plato’s Later
Epistemology, but that distinction will not itself resolve the tension, for chronology cuts across
it. Anamnesis is, explicitly, a doctrine of the early Phaedo and Meno, but it is also implicitly
present in the Philebus2, and, in a way, in the theory of the Sophist: language itself contains the
record of the map of forms, though it has to be teased out (διά γάρ τήν άλλήλων των ειδών
συμπλοκήν ό λόγος· γέγονεν ήμίν 259e)3. Abstraction is perhaps most clearly described in the

Symposium, but it remains the Platonic tool par excellence from the very early 'What is...?'
dialogues right through to the Sophist (e.g. 240a). And although one can draw a chronological
bell curve of mystical excitement in Plato, beginning low in the Phaedo, running to fever pitch
in the Phaedrus, the Symposium, and the Republic, and going calmer in the late dialogues, still
certain mystical elements — like the clear segregation of initiates, (philosophers or dialecticians)
from noninitiates — run throughout.
We cannot, then, resolve the tension by a simple appeal to Plato's development. Nor, I
think, can we resolve it straightforwardly by distinguishing higher from lower forms — saying,
for example, that the form of bed or of mud or of hair is learned by abstraction, but the form of
the Good or Beauty or Being has to be -grasped by mystical intuition. It is true, of course, that
Plato's most striking mystical language occurs when he is talking about the knowledge of the
moré important forms; but in the Sophist the culmination of the philosophopher's life-work is
that of seeing the totality of the forms in their relationship to each other (253d-e). Again, it won't
do to think that anamnesis will suffice for lower forms like equality but we need mystical
intuition for the Beautiful; in the Phaedo the anamnesis account is said explicitly to apply to
beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness as much as it does to equality (75d).
So a simple distinction between lower and higher forms will not resolve our tension
either. Nor, indeed, can we hope to do it by importing a distinction between two kinds of
knowledge, say knowledge as practical use of concepts vs knowledge as contemplation of forms.
This might be tempting, for the anamnesis doctrine of the Meno or the Phaedo seems pretty
practical: comparing sticks and doing elementary geometrical proofs, and the mystical passages of
the Symposium or the Republic seem contemplative. But it will run into the difficulty that the
hallowed term έπιστήμη is used in both contexts (e.g. Phaedo 75c, Republic 510ff). And it will run
into the difficulty, also, that the high mystical moments of the Phaedrus are themselves
represented as moments of recollection, of remembering.
One might, finally, seek an easy resolution of at least some of the tension by downplaying
the mystical element in Plato, by relegating the high language to the category of myth, and so
sending it off for consideration under the eternally recurring question of the use that Plato
intends to make of myth. Indeed, it seems to me, that there is almost a tacit agreement among
Plato scholars to do just this4. Virtually none of the standard general works on Plato has a
chapter on Plato's mysticism5, and very few even have index-entries under 'mysticism', and
where they do they usually flag nothing very substantial — remarks in passing, referring loosely
to 'mystical elements' in Plato's thought, or to passages of mystical language6. Plato is not, in
general, taken seriously as a mystic. I think it would be useful to consider whether he should be.
The problem, of course, is that 'mysticism' is itself a vague idea. I think, though, we can
make some headway with the question by establishing a rough and ready distinction between
what I shall call soft mysticism on the one hand and hard mysticism on the other7. By soft
mysticism I mean the indulgence in obscure language, extensive allegory, or extravagant images;
the suggestion of such language is that what is being expressed is difficult to say otherwise — or
not permitted to be said otherwise. I have in mind here such things as the visions of Ezekiel, the
Gospel of John with its impenetrable language about λόγο?, the Apocalypse, or, the newest
addition to the ancient corpus of mystical literature, the 'Chariots of Glory' scroll from
Qumran8. The Kabbalah falls into this category, as do the amazing constructions of Marsilio
Ficino9, and the works of Madame Blavatsky. Many works are softly mystical from beginning to
end; others have only moments of such soft mysticism — I might instance even Aristotle on
νοϋ? ποιητικό? or on voC? θύραθεν.

From all this huge and diverse corpus of soft mysticsm I would want to distinguish what I
shall call hard mysticism, which is the literature of a peculiar and special experience whose
marks are or include the following: (a) it is the experience of loving union with God or absolute
reality; (b) it is a direct experience, and it is frequently described in terms of touch or sexual
union; (c) it is an experience which seems immune from doubt — self-authenticating; (d)
though one may prepare oneself for it, the experience itself is gratuitous; (e) the experience is
usually sudden and unannounced, being often described as 'rapture'; (f) it is regarded as the
highest sort of moment of which human life is capable, and those who have had the experience
typically devote all their efforts to being able to have it again; (g) it typically requires a long and
arduous preparation. Readers of the Christian mystical tradition will recognize in these marks
such mystics as Hildegard of Bingen, Julian of Norwich, Ignatius of Loyola, John of the Cross,
Theresa of Avila, and many others.
It needs no argument that Plato is at least a soft mystic, and that is what is frequently
meant when people speak of his mystical passages. He uses allegories, he describes visions, he
takes over the language of the Mysteries10. The interesting question is whether Plato is also a
hard mystic. I think that in fact the experience he describes as knowing or contemplating the
supreme forms exhibits most of the above marks. Let us go through some of the evidence, and
then think about the implications.
(a) the experience of loving union with God or absolute reality; and (b) direct experience,
frequently described in terms of touch or sexual union. Let us look at two texts which hold some
surprises.
Republic 490a7-b7:
TAp’ οϊιν δή ού μετρίω? άπολογησόμεθα δτι πρό? τό δν πεφικώ? εΐη άμιλλασθαι δ γε δντω?
φιλομαθή?, καί ούκ έπιμένοι έπί τοί? δο£α£ομένοι? είναι πολλοί? έκάστοι?, άλλ’ 1οι καί ούκ
άμβλύνοιτο ούδ’ άποληγοι του £ρωτο?, πρίν αύτού δ <·στιν έκάστου τη? φύσεω? άψασθαι φ
προσήκει ψυχή? έφάπτεσθαι του τοιούτου - προσήκει Ôè συγγενεί - φ πλησιάσα? καί μιγεί?
τφ δντι δντω?, γεννήσα? νουν καί άλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καί άλήθω? £φη καί τρέφοιτο καί
οδτω λήγοι ώδίνο?, πρίν δ’ οδ;
Will it not be a fair plea in his defense to say that it was the nature of the real lover of
knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many
particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his
passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with the
nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs to lay hold of that
kind of reality — the part akin to it, namely — and through that approaching it, and
consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge,
and truly live and grow, and so find surcease from his travail of soul, but not before? (tr.
Shorey11)
This is part of Plato’s description and defence in Book VI of the true philosopher. A number of
things in this passage are worthy of note. The philosopher strives (άμιλλασθαι) toward being.
What Shorey translates as passion is in Greek Ιρω?: this drawing of the philosopher toward being
is a matter of love12. And this love is not blunted until the philosopher has laid hold (άψασθαι),
has touched, the real being of each thing. And notice now that the philosopher approaches
reality and consorts with it. Jowett translates 'drawing near and mingling and becoming
incorporate with very being'. Adam in his commentary ad loc. writes 'having come nigh unto
and married with true being....’ The Greek for consorting, mingling, marrying here is μιγεί?, one
of whose common meanings is to have sexual intercourse; and indeed that must be its meaning
here, since we immediately learn that the mingling results in the begetting. Our standard
translations have erred by indirection: Plato clearly uses the language of sexual intercourse,

sexual possession, to describe the mystical state of union with being. And what about this being?
Shorey has the soul consort with reality really, though the other two translations take the adverb
όντως* to qualify δντι: true being, very being. This seems to me a tempting way to take it. And
what is the ultimate result of this intercourse with the really real? The philosopher άΧήθως* £ώη
καί τρέφοιτο; the philosopher comes really alive, his life is new.
Republic 500c9-d2:
θείω δή καί κοσμίω ö γε φιλόσοφος δμιλων κόσμιός* re καί θείος* είς* τδ δυνατόν άνθρώπω
γίγνεται
Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly
and divine in the measure permitted to man. (tr. Shorey)
Here we have the identification of what it is that the philosopher associates with as divine, and
as orderly. Being itself, true being, the form of the Good is therefore divine, and it is orderly.
Why orderly? This is aristocratic Greek tidy-mindedness, the deep moral and aesthetic
preference for having a place for everything and everything in its place13. And what is this
associating? The verb δμιλέω means to consort with, to frequent, to talk with, to have sexual
intercourse with. Probably some translation using the word ’intercourse' would be best. It would
preserve the ambiguity of δμιλών, an ambiguity which Plato's contemporary readers surely heard,
and which he surely intended.
In other places Plato uses the language not of touch or sexual possession but rather that of
sight to describe the philosopher's knowledge of the forms (Ιδεΐν, Republic 511al; δράν, 476bl0;
θεάσθαι., 518cl0; αύγή, 540b7); and of course the whole notion of contemplation which became
such a topos in antiquity was constructed on the model of vision, θεωρία. Perhaps this is a pity.
(c) the experience seems immune from doubt — self-authenticating.
Famously and infamously, Plato considers that knowledge in the strong sense, knowledge of the
forms, is infallible (άναμάρτητον, 477e6). A very great deal of scholarly ink has been expended
over the difficulty of understanding why a dialectical method of enquiry which proceeds by
making assumptions and testing them should ever be able to yield infallible certainty. In such an
epistemological approach nothing is ever final, all is subject to question and revision. But the
difficulty vanishes — I mean the difficulty of interpretation — if we realize that the infallible
certainty is the product of mystical intuition, and that one of the standard features of this
experience is precisely the sense of unshakable certainty which surrounds it. The anhypothetical
principle of knowledge is a different kind of knowing, the product of a mystical experience14.
Just understand that Plato was a mystic, and take him seriously as one, and the long difficulty
about dialectic and certainty vanishes.
(d) though one may prepare oneself for it, the experience itself is gratuitous. Here, I think,
is one place where Plato sometimes misses the mark, or one of the marks, of hard mysticism.
For he sometimes writes as though gaining knowledge of the forms is a matter of the exercise of
will and discipline, and for one who has the discipline, is subject to the will. Thus in the
Republic, where Plato describes the last stage in the formation of the Rulers, when they have
reached the age of fifty and have been through all the other tests.
Republic 540a7ff:
άναγκαστέον άνακλίναντας* τήν της* ψυχής* αύγήν είς* αύτδ άποβλέψαι τδ ττάσι φως* παρέχον,
καί Ιδόντας* τδ άγαθδν αυτό....
We shall require them to tum upward the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that
which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself.... (tr. Shorey)

The clear implication is that one one has been through all that preparatory work, one has only to
turn the eye of the soul to the Form of the Good, and one will see it. The formula Αποβλέπειv et?
seems to imply that the thing one looks at is a thing one will see (unlike, for example, άποβλέπειν
πρό?)15. It would indeed be awkward for the ideal state if the mystical experiences which the
rulers need to run it were entirely gratuitous. For if the tap of knowledge of the forms were to be
turned off by the gods then the whole assumption on which the elaborate structure of the state is
built would vanish. On the other hand, a slightly different accent is present in the account of
this moment of accession to mystical knowledge in the Symposium:
Symposium 210e2ff:
δ? γάρ άν μέχρι ένταυθα πρό? τά έρωτικά παιδαγωγηθή, θεώμενο? έφεξη? τε καί όρθω? τά
καλά, πρό? τέλο? ήδη Ιών των έρωτικών εξαίφνη? κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστόν τήν φύσιν καλόν,
τοίιτο έκεΐνο, ώ Σώκρατε?, οΐ δή ένεκεν καί οΐ έμπροσθεν πάντε? πόνοι ήσαν....
Whoever has been initiated so far in the mysteries of Love and has viewed all these
aspects of the beautiful in due succession, is at last drawing near the final revelation. And
now, Socrates, there bursts upon him that wondrous vision which is the very soul of the
beauty he has toiled so long for. (tr. Joyce16)
Here the meaning of κατόψεταί is clearly to see or descry, rather than to look down upon. The
initiate suddenly (έξαίφνη?) sees Beauty itself. The implication here, unlike in the passage from
the Republic which we have just examined, is that the looking does not itself guarantee the
seeing; the seeing is in that measure gratuitous. Nevertheless, it is also implied that whoever
does the preparatory work correctly, going through all the stages of erotic education in order, will
be vouchsafed this vision. So in this passage from the Symposium Plato does not suggest that
one can see Beauty itself at will just by looking at it; but he does seem to suggest that the vision is
eventually granted to those who have prepared properly.
Symposium 211d8-el
τί δητα, έφη, οΐόμεθα, έί Τφ γένοιτο αύτό τό καλόν ΙδέΙν είλικρινέ?, καθαρόν....
But if it were given to a man to gaze on beauty's very self — unsullied, unalloyed.... (tr.
Joyce)
Here the use of the phrase γένεσθαι τω suggests passivity and gratuitousness: if it were given to a
person to have this vision.
(e)
the experience is usually sudden and unannounced, being often described as 'rapture'.
The idea of suddenness is present in the passage we have just considered. But the idea of
rapture, of being forcibly seized (raped) by the divine is not very prominent in Plato. Two
passages in the Phaedrus , however, need to be mentioned.
Phaedrus 250a5-bl
όλίγαι δή λείπονται al? τό τη? μνήμη? Ικανω? πάρεσην alrrai δέ, δταν τι των έκει
δμοίωμα ιδωσιν, έκπλήττονται καί ούκέτ’ έν αίττών γίγνονται, δ δ’ έστι τό πάθο? άγνουσι....
Few indeed are left that can still remember much, but when these discern some likeness
of the things yonder, they are amazed, and no longer masters of themselves, and know
not what is come upon them...(tr. Hackforth17)
And then there is the passage at 251a3ff, where the person who sees 'a godlike face or a beautiful
form’at once begins to shudder (έφρι£ε), and then καί Ιδρώ? καί θερμότη? άήθη? λαμβάνει — a

strange sweating and fever seize him. But we musn't make too much of these passages, for they
are, after all, intended as descriptions of the arising of sexual love; what makes them relevant to
us here is of course that Plato explains the phenomenon of love as an urge to the contemplation
of the form of Beauty. To feel such love is to be forcibly seized by beauty, or — if the analysis of
the Phaedrus is correct — to be forcibly seized by the memory of Beauty.
(fl the experience is regarded as the highest sort of moment of which human life is
capable, and those who have had the experience typically devote all their efforts to being able to
have it again.
Symposium 211dlff:
ένταδθα του βίου, ώ φίλε Σώκρατε?, έφη ή Μαντινική ξένη, εΧπερ που άλλοθι, βιωτόν
άνθρώπω, θεωμένψ αύτό τό καλόν.
And if, my dear Socrates, Diotima went on, man’s life is ever worth the living, it is when
he has attained this vision of the very soul of beauty, (tr. Joyce)
The text makes the mystical point and the translation masks it: θεωμένφ is present, not perfect,
and so it should be translated by the present tense. It is the moment of contemplation that makes
life truly worth living, not the fact of having contemplated. It is clear that having contemplated
has its other rewards, like the production of true virtue and consequent immortality (212a). And
the longing of someone who has once had the vision of the forms to do so again is eloquently
expressed in those well-known passages at the end of Book VII of the Republic, where the rulers
have to be forced back down into the cave for periods of service.
(g) the experience typically requires a long and arduous preparation. The fifty-year
strenuous training of the rulers before they can turn their gaze upward (Republic 539-540), and
the due regimen of toil (πόνοι) in erotics (Symposium 210e) are presented as necessary (and
perhaps, we saw, sufficient) conditions for being able to experience the supreme forms.
From all of this it seems to me pretty clear that Plato was, in the hard sense, a mystic — or
at least that he had had some mystical experiences and based a good deal of his thought on
them— and that we must take this fact into account as we interpret and assess him. His thought
was formed, in part, by some unusual and exciting theophantic (or ontophantic) adventures that
few can share. His closed theocratic utopia, which seems repellent to us, is justified very simply
in his own mind, and rendered understandable to ours, by the sense of infallibility which seems
to be an unvarying part of mystical experiences. His fantastic construction of an art of erotics as
the engine of the soul's ascent to mysticism is a real contender if indeed his mystical experiences
of Beauty happened as he says they did. He keeps company with John of the Cross and
Marie de l'Incarnation as much as he does with Lucretius or Leibniz. He is not fully a
philosopher. Why then, we may well wonder, is the history of philosophy a series of footnotes
to him?
*****

I would now like to open a parenthesis, but an important one, to consider the role of sex
in Plato's mysticism. Vlastos, in his article 'Love in Plato', and especially in its appendix 'Sex in
Platonic Love'18 has argued that Platonic love was anything but platonic19; using evidence
mainly from the Phaedrus, he shows that the lover is, and is broadly expected to be, a sexed,
sexual, and sexually active person. Nevertheless it would be hard to deny that the general drift of
this dialogue is that sexual restraint, if not abstinence, is the recommended course. Thus, at
256alff, we have the celebrated depiction of the pair of lovers lying side by side, desiring sex, and

resisting it and going on thereby to a life of blessed happiness and concord 'for the power of evil
in the soul has been subjected, and the power of goodness liberated' (tr. Hackforth) (δουλωσάμενοι
μέν ω κακία ψυχή? έγίγνετο, έλευθερώσαντε? δέ ω άρετή). Nevertheless those who do succumb are
still counted blessed, even if not as blessed as those who do not (256d). While not a stem or
implacable attitude toward loving sex, this seems at least to advocate what we might now call
sublimation: the sexual urge is restrained and its energy passes into other things.
I think the picture in the Symposium is rather different. Before Diotima gets to the
mystical ascent, and while she is describing the right uses of love (paideia through pederasty),
she says of the lover who undertakes the education of the beloved:
Symposium 209c2-3
άπτόμενο? γάρ οίμαι του καλού καί δμιλών αύτφ, ä πάλαι έκύει τίκτει καί γεννφ...
...by constant association with so much beauty...he will be delivered of the burden he has
laboured under all these years (tr. Joyce)
Constant association indeed! άπτομαι has as its general meaning to fasten upon or grasp; one of
its prominent figurative meanings — found in Plato and Aristotle among others20 — is to have
sexual intercourse. And we have already seen that όμιλέω means to frequent, to talk with, and to
have sexual intercourse with (a new slant on homiletics!). Moreover the sexual imagery is
underlined by the pregnancy and the giving birth that is described in the context. The translator
has done us a disservice here: Plato's language about the time which the lover and the beloved
spend together is charged with sexual ambiguity. The right translation would be a word like
'intercourse', leaving the resolution of the ambiguity to the reader's imagination21.
There is a problem, next, about just what it is that is generated as a result of this love. On
the one hand it appears to be virtue and wisdom in the beloved youth (209cl). On the other it
appears to be poetry and the creative arts (209a3; dl), and finally laws and constitutions (209bl,
d3ff). Is Plato suggesting that homoerotic satisfaction is a necessary condition, or even a frequent
concomitant, of artistic creativity? Is this gay stereotyping at a very early date (before there was
even homosexuality)? It may ring true to us, but it is very surprising. Is he suggesting, though
this sounds much odder to our ears, that homoerotic satisfaction is a condition of legislative
creativity? Are the best parliamentarians the gay ones? What is perhaps even stranger for us in
this set of ideas is that the creativity, whether artistic or legislative, happens when erotic desire is
satisfied; we are very used to the opposite idea, the Freudian idea, that frustrated eros makes
great artists. These are surprising ideas.
So far, however, we have been considering the hypomystical case, the relatively ordinary
case of erotic love bearing fruits of the spirit. What about the path of mystical ascent? What role
is sex to play here?
Symposium 210a4-8
δει γάρ, έφη, τδν όρθω? Ιόντα έπΐ τούτο τό πράγμα άρχεσθαι μέν νέον δντα levai έπΐ τά
καλά σώματα, καί πρώτον μέν, èàv όρθω? ήγηται δ ήγούμενο?, ένδ? αύτδν σώματος èpâv καί
ένταϋθα γεννάν λόγου? καλού?, έπειτα....
It is necessary ... for one who proceeds correctly in this matter to begin when young by
heading for the beautiful bodies; and first, if his guide leads him correctly, he must love
one body and generate beautiful speeches therein. Next.... (tr. Rosen22)

What is this Ιέναι έπΐ τά καλά σώματα? Jowett memorably translates it as to 'visit beautiful
forms'. It is striking that the phrase Ιέναι έττί is used twice in the same sentence, presumably
with different meanings. In the first it means to embark upon a venture (πράγμα); in the second
it seems more natural to take it to mean to frequent, to keep the company of, some translators
suggest 'to devote oneself to'. But why τά καλά σώματα? Why the beautiful bodies? Most
translators have ignored the definite article here. But its presence suggests a far more deliberate
activity than is suggested if it is not there. Not so much 'frequent beautiful bodies’ as ’go for the
beautiful ones'. And then another curiosity: who is the guide? Dover23, ad loc., takes it to be the
lover, the older man of the pair, the erastes. But this would entail one of two unlikely
interpretations, either that the erastes tries to make the eromenos fall in love with him (not an
unlikely thing in itself, but a very strange way to express it), or else that the erastes tries to make
the eromenos fall in love with someone else. Who, then, is the ήγούμενο?? I think the best
answer here is the one that Bury gave24 ad loc.: the μυσταγωγό?, the spiritual director, if you
like25. And once we see this we need to become clear as to who the véos* is. It is not, surely, pace
Dover, the eromenos of the traditional pederastic-paideutic pair; it is rather the young man who
is himself preparing to fall in love, the one who is about to be an erastes. So the young man
should keep the company of the attractive youths, so that the constant sight of such beauty will
spur him to fall in love with one of them, to take a young eromenos. Now this generation of
beautiful speeches (what an extraordinary idea!) seems the same as what happened in the
nonmystical love in the last passage we considered. So the approach to mystical love is via
nonmystical love of the conventional, satisfied homoerotic, arts-and-laws-generating kind. The
relatively ordinary love which Plato characterizes as spiritually procréant (209a2) is identical
with the first step in the mystical ascent, and it, we have seen, is a sexually satisfied love.
But what happens then? At 210bl Plato says that having been stirred by beauty to fall in
love with one person, the aspirant to mystical vision realizes (κατανοήσαι) that beauty of one
body is related to the beauty of another, and so he loves the one selfsame beauty that is on all
bodies bodies. He steps, that is, in one leap, from loving one person to loving the beauty of all
bodies. But a little later, when Diotima reviews the procedure in the peroration of her speech, it
is put differently.
Symposium 211b5-c5
δταν δή τις άπδ τώνδε διά τδ όρθώ? παιδεραστειν έπανιών έκεΐνο τό καλόν άρχηται καθοραν,
σχεδόν &ν τι &πτοιτο του τέλους, τούτο γάρ 8ή έστι τό όρθως έπΐ τά έρωτικά Ιέναι ή ύπ’
άλλου άγεσθαι, άρχόμενον άπό τώνδε των καλών έκείνου ένεκα του καλού άεΐ έπανιέναι,
ώσπερ έπαναβασμοΊδ* χρώμενον, άπό ένδ? έπΐ δύο καί άπδ δυοΐν έπΐ πάντα τά καλά σώματα,
καί άπδ των καλών σωμάτων έπΐ τά καλά έπιτηδεύματα....
...when someone ascending from the previously mentioned stages through the correct
kind of pederasty begins to see that beauty, he will almost grasp the end. This is the right
procedure or way of being led by another in erotic matters; beginning from the earlier
beauties for the sake of this one, he must always ascend, as on the steps of a stair, from one
to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; and from beautiful bodies to beautiful
customs.... (tr. Rosen)
What is striking here is that instead of quickly loving the single selfsame beauty that is in all
bodies, the aspirant loves one individual beautiful body, then two individual beautiful bodies,
then all beautiful bodies.... It is only at the end of the procedure that he is portrayed as stepping
from loving individual beautiful things to loving beauty itself. This point is emphasized, it
seems to me, by the explicit mention of the stage at which he loves two bodies. The mystic ascent
requires erotic attention to many individuals before the attention to the universal is possible. In
a word: erotic promiscuity.

In none of this theory of the Symposium is there any suggestion of sublimated desire.
Sexual desire, eros, is the engine of ascent, though to be sure it is like a the primary stage of a
rocket, which falls away when its work is done.
*****

We return now to consider the tension in Plato's epistemology which has driven this
enquiry. Is the knowledge of the forms a priori, a posteriori by abstraction, or a posteriori by
mystical intuition? Or are these three in some way compatible?
Phaedrus 249b5-cl
ού γάρ ή ye μήποτε Ιδοΐισα τήν άλήθειαν et? τόδε Αξει τό σχήμα. δεί γάρ άνθρωποι/ συνιέναι
κατ’ είδο? λεγόμενον, εκ πολλών Ιόν αίσθήσεων εΐ? εν λογισμω συναιρούμενον τοΰτο δ’
εστιν άνάμνησι? εκείνων ä ποτ’ εΧδεν ήμών ή ψυχή....
For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter into this our human form — seeing
that man must needs understand the language of forms, passing from a plurality of
perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning — and such understanding is a
recollection of those things which our souls beheld aforetime.... (tr. Hackforth)
This passage proposes that recollection is a precondition of abstraction26. The problem is, of
course, that if you already have the idea of beauty, you do not need to perform abstractions to
achieve it. On the other hand, if you do not already have the idea of beauty, it is hard to see how
you manage to group together beautiful things in order to abstract the idea. The solution to this
part of the tension, which is an old sophistic argument, surely lies in distinguishing clarities of
knowledge. One may dimly remember a form, just enough to do some grouping and abstracting;
but the grouping and abstracting clarifies the form remarkably27.
And can knowledge be both by abstraction and by mystical intuition? This is surely the
whole problem of the unhypothetical principle, the problem of how a method of enquiry and
concept-construction should end in certain and infallible knowledge. I have already urged the
solution which lies in seeing the mystical knowledge not as a sure product generated logically by
the method, but rather the method as a preparatory exercise upon whose completion the
mystical intuition may or may not supervene. (Plato is not unfailingly helpful to me here, since,
as we noted above, he sometimes writes as though mystical intuition is a sure-fire result of the
preparatory work.)
And finally, can we reconcile knowledge of the forms as recollection with knowledge of
the forms as mystical intuition? Prima facie, it would seem not, for the one is a priori and the
other a posteriori. Mystical experience is normally cast as a fresh and absolutely true and valid
contact with being itself; not a contact with a remembered image of being. Plato, to my
knowledge, does not consider this problem, does not help us to resolve this tension. But I think
there is a way to soften it. The distinction between a priori knowledge — knowledge which we
have independently of experience — and a posteriori knowledge — which we have only on the
basis of experience — seems a firm one as long as the experience in question is sensory
experience. But if we recall that mystical experience is for Plato an intellectual experience, the
distinction softens. If I learn and know the classical quadratures of lunes, and then call them to
mind again, am I not knowing them afresh? Does not the distinction between knowledge and
remembered knowledge quickly blur when the knowledge in question is not sensory but
intellectual?
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